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Abstract 
 
The research reported in this paper was conducted under the project The Social Impacts 
of Environmental Taxes: Removing Regressivity, funded by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation under its Programme on Environment and Social Concerns. The project is 
investigating the social implications of environmental taxes and charges in relation to 
four environmental issues – the household use of energy, water, and transport, and the 
generation of waste. This is a report of the component on the household use of transport. 
 
Traffic growth in the 1990s was lower than is expected for the period to 2010 because the 
fuel duty escalator made petrol and diesel prices rise much faster than inflation and 
suppressed the growth in traffic that would have otherwise take place (Glaister 2001). 
Because of the freeze in fuel duty since 1999, which is officially projected to continue for 
the rest of the decade, fuel prices are falling in real terms. 
 
Transport is the only sector of the UK economy which has increased its emissions since 
1990. Thanks to increasing fuel efficiency which offset the relatively small growth in 
traffic during the 1990s, emissions from road traffic did not increase substantially. The 
main cause of the increase was growth in domestic aviation (DfT 2003a). 
 
An even more serious increase in transport emissions which is not even included in the 
national inventory is international air travel by UK residents. The increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions from the UK’s international aviation between 1990 and 2010 is expected to 
be of the same order of magnitude as the 12.5 per cent reduction that the UK is 
committed to under the Kyoto protocol. In other words, the increase in international 
aviation will essentially negate the reductions in the other sectors, so that in reality the 
UK’s emissions will have been roughly stable, rather than declining (Edinburgh Centre 
for Carbon Management 2002). 
 
The decline in non-aviation emissions up to 2010 is not expected to continue beyond that 
date without further measures, particularly to restrain traffic growth. In addition, the 2 
government is planning to permit the building of additional runways to enable massive 
growth in aviation. 
 
Taxation of car use has been a particularly sensitive issue since the fuel protests of 
autumn 2000. Petrol taxes are not regressive in aggregate because poorer households 
are less likely to have a car. However, petrol taxes are regressive among motorists (Blow 
and Crawford 1997). Nearly a third of households do not have a car and non-car owning 
households are concentrated among the lowest income groups. Nearly two-thirds of 
households in the lowest income quintile do not have a car (Lucas, Grosvenor and 
Simpson 2001).  
 
The distributional impacts of several possible measures to restrain the likely future 
increase in emissions from transport were investigated: 
 
1.  Increasing fuel duties and abolishing vehicle excise duty (VED) 
2.  Increasing fuel duties and using the money to subsidise public transport 
3.  Increasing fuel duties and using the money to increase benefits 
4.  Graduated vehicle excise duty (VED) 
5.  Graduated car purchase tax 
6. Congestion  charging 
7.  Domestic tradable quotas 
 
If fuel duties are increased, the most effective of the three ways in terms of compensating 
low-income motorists would be to abolish VED. Increasing benefits would also have an 
effect, but not as much, while using the money to subsidise public transport would have 
almost no effect because households that have cars generally use public transport very 
little. However, if the aim is to be progressive, then increasing benefits is best, subsidising 
public transport is next best (because the poorest are more likely to use public transport 
than have a car) and abolishing VED is least good. The particular concern about 
increasing fuel duty is that it would have a negative effect on poor motorists in rural 
areas. People who live in rural areas tend to drive further and use more fuel than those 
who live in urban areas. 
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Another approach to limit emissions would be graduated VED or a graduated car 
purchase tax. In fact, VED graduated according to carbon dioxide emissions was 
introduced in 2001, but the maximum rate is only at 185g/km, which does not distinguish 
between ordinary family cars and ‘gas guzzlers’ such as four-wheel-drive vehicles. A 
higher rate of VED for ‘gas guzzlers’ would have little effect on poor households as few 
own such large inefficient vehicles.  
 
A graduated car purchase tax could replace graduated VED, putting the entire cost at the 
beginning. The rationale is that car buyers greatly underestimate fuel costs and private 
buyers presently have little incentive to buy cars with a higher up-front cost that would 
save fuel in the long run. A car purchase tax would increase the price of second-hand 
vehicles (very few low-income households buy new cars), but it would be balanced by the 
abolition of VED. The weakness with a graduated car purchase tax is that it would only 
affect decisions about fuel efficiency, not about use. 
 
The measure which has received the most attention in the last few years is congestion 
charging. A revenue neutral congestion charging system would lead to a redistribution of 
money from urban drivers to rural drivers. If revenue neutrality was achieved by the 
abolition of VED, then both congestion and emissions would be reduced (CfIT 2002), but 
if it was achieved through reduction in fuel duty then although congestion would fall, 
overall emissions would rise (Foley and Fergusson 2003). The problem is that the 
abolition of VED would only allow for a modest level of congestion charging, sufficient to 
offset a couple of years’ traffic growth. Congestion charging that tackled traffic growth 
would have to be revenue raising. Revenue raising would also be necessary to fund the 
improvements in public transport that would be needed in order to cope with a modal 
switch due to congestion charging. That would inevitably mean that low-income urban 
households would have to pay more if they continued to drive. 
 
The final approach considered was domestic tradable quotas (DTQs). The idea behind 
DTQs is that every adult resident would receive for free an equal number of carbon units 
to cover their annual carbon emissions, including private transport. Those who used less 
than their entitlement would sell their surplus units to others who wanted to use more. 4 
The option of providing each adult with a full quota and each child with a half quota was 
also considered. 
 
If a DTQ system covered only the carbon emissions from household energy use and 
motoring, then it would be progressive, but around 30 per cent of low-income households 
would be losers (because they use more than average amount of energy and would have 
to buy emissions permits to cover this use). If DTQs also covered greenhouse gas 
emissions from aviation (which are strongly skewed towards the wealthy, while the 
poorest fly very little) then around 25 per cent of low-income households would still lose. 
However, if only emissions from motoring and aviation were included then a smaller 
proportion of low-income households would lose out, no more than 10-15 per cent. 
 
A system of DTQs covering motoring and aviation would be an efficient and progressive 
way of controlling carbon emissions from these sources. In their absence, and in a 
political context that makes increased fuel duties politically infeasible, at least partly 
because of their impact on low-income motorists, revenue-raising congestion charges 
could be used to control traffic growth and hence emissions, with low-income motoring 
households being compensated through the abolition of VED, and further compensation 




Transport is the only sector in the UK that increased its carbon emissions between 1990 
and 2000. It is also the only sector that is expected to increase its emissions between 2000 
and 2010 (Foley and Fergusson 2003). Increasing car traffic is the main cause of these 
projected increases. Car traffic has gone up by 79 per cent since 1980, from 215 to 384 
billion vehicle kilometres. It grew sharply in the 1980s, but has been rising less quickly 
since. Road traffic grew by 14 per cent between 1990 and 2000 (DfT 2003a). It is 
projected to grow by another 20 to 25 per cent between 2000 and 2010 (DfT 2003b). The 
reason why car traffic growth in the 1990s was lower than is expected for the 2000s was 
because of the fuel duty escalator, which increased fuel duty by 5-6 per cent above 
inflation each year from 1993 to 1999, while fuel prices are now falling in real terms 
because fuel duty has been frozen. For the first time in a period of rapid economic 
growth, in the late 1990s traffic grew less quickly than GDP. Econometric analysis 
indicates that the fuel duty escalator revealed significant price elasticity (Glaister 2001). 
 
The overall cost of motoring (including purchase, maintenance, petrol and oil, and tax and 
insurance) has remained at or below its 1980 level in real terms, although the real cost of 
fuel is now 12 per cent higher than in 1980, despite a fall in 2001. In contrast to overall 
motoring costs, public transport fares have risen in real terms over the last 20 years. In 
2001, bus and coach fares were 31 per cent higher and rail fares 37 per cent higher than in 
1980. Over the same period, average disposable income has gone up more than 80 per 
cent in real terms. Transport has therefore become more affordable, with a greater 
improvement in the affordability of car use than that of public transport (DfT 2003a). 
 
Although the majority of the growth in transport over the last twenty years has been in 
travel by car, up from 388 billion passenger kilometres in 1980 to 624 billion in 2001 - an 
increase of 61 per cent, there were increases in travel by rail and domestic air, of 34 and 
157 per cent respectively. Distance travelled by bus and coach fell by 17 per cent between 
1980 and 1992, but it has since increased by around 7 per cent. Emissions of CO2 from 
transport end users increased from 28 to 37 million tonnes of carbon between 1980 and 
1990 - a time when road traffic was growing quickly. Despite further growth in traffic 6 
since 1990, levels of CO2 emissions from road transport have been growing at a much 
slower rate, due mainly to technological improvements and the use of cleaner fuels. 
Energy consumption by transport has increased continuously since 1981, from 34 to 55 
million tonnes of oil equivalent by 2001 - up 62 per cent. Road transport accounted for 
most of the increase during the 1980s, but has since been fairly stable despite continued 
growth in traffic. Indeed, most of transport's increase in energy consumption during the 
1990s was accounted for by domestic aviation, up from 7 to 12 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (DfT 2003a).  
 
Domestic aviation accounts for only 5 per cent of the UK’s total aviation emissions, but 
emissions from international aviation are not included in government transport statistics 
or counted under the Kyoto Protocol. We have a situation where the Government’s 
Climate Change Programme has policies to reduce emissions from other sectors, but 
aviation emissions are being ignored. The effect is far from trivial. The emissions from 
international aviation emanating from the UK are not included in the national inventory 
and are not counted under the Kyoto protocol. Carbon emissions from international 
aviation emanating from UK airports nearly doubled from 4.0 million tonnes of carbon 
(MtC) in 1990 to 7.8 MtC in 2000, and are projected to increase to around 12.3 MtC by 
2010. The IPCC estimates that the global warming potential of emissions from aviation is 
2-4 times that of the carbon emissions alone (because of the effect of the emission of 
water vapour and NOx at very high altitudes), so the increase between 1990 and 2000 was 
equivalent to 7.6-15.2 MtC. The expected increase 1990-2010 is equivalent in global 
warming potential to 16.6-33.2 MtC - or 8-16 per cent of UK baseline emissions. In other 
words, the UK's 12.5 per cent reduction in domestic emissions between 1990 and 2010 
under the Kyoto protocol will be largely or more than offset by its increase in 
international aviation emissions. The middle traffic growth projection to 2020 would 
increase emissions to 18 MtC, equivalent to 36-72 MtC. That is a further 5.7 MtC, 
equivalent to 11.4-22.8 MtC or another 6-12 per cent of emissions. The rapid and 
uncontrolled rise in aviation emissions is likely to overwhelm the effect of other 
government policies to reduce carbon emissions (Edinburgh Centre for Carbon 
Management 2002). 
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However, there is no room for complacency about future road traffic growth. It was held 
back in the 1990s by the fuel duty escalator. Road traffic is predicted to grow by 20-25 
per cent between 2000 and 2010. Because the average fuel efficiency of cars is projected 
to improve by 20 per cent over the same period, the result would be broadly stable carbon 
emissions (DfT 2003b). These conclusions have been questioned in a recent IPPR study 
(Foley and Fergusson 2003) which argued that the improvement in fuel efficiency 
predicted by the National Transport Model (DfT 2003b) was based on optimistic and 
somewhat dubious assumptions. The model also assumes that there will be no increase in 
fuel duty and a slight decrease in the price of oil over the decade.  
 
Taxation of car use has been a particularly sensitive issue since the fuel protests of 
autumn 2000. Petrol taxes are not regressive in aggregate because poorer households are 
less likely to have a car. However, petrol taxes are regressive among motorists (Blow and 
Crawford 1997).  
 
Nearly a third of households do not have a car and non-car owning households are 
concentrated among the lowest income groups. Sixty-three per cent of households in the 
lowest income quintile and 50 per cent in the second lowest do not have access to a car. 
By contrast, only 22 per cent of households in the third quintile, 12 per cent in the fourth 
quintile and 6 per cent in the top quintile are without access to a car (Lucas, Grosvenor 
and Simpson 2001). However, in all quintiles travel by car (whether as a driver or a 
passenger) accounted for most of the miles travelled. Some have claimed that this shows 
that public transport is inadequate for the mobility and accessibility requirements of a 
modern society so that even those on low incomes will attempt to own or have access to a 
car (ibid). Increasing car ownership has led to a decline in public transport, particularly 
buses, and to travel-intensive lifestyles which are considered to more or less require the 
use of a car. Some developments, for example of out-of-town supermarkets and hospitals, 
seem to reinforce these trends. 
 
A group that is commonly identified as particularly vulnerable is low-income drivers in 
rural areas, who are particularly sensitive to price increases, but have fewer transport 
alternatives than people in urban areas. Only 41 per cent of low-income households (the 
bottom two quintiles) own cars, but 57 per cent of low-income households in rural areas 8 
own cars (Skinner and Ferguson 1998). Low-income car owners tend to spend less on 
fuel: 78 per cent of the average, and they drive 77 per cent of the average number of 
miles. Low-income drivers in rural areas drive 22 per cent further than other low-income 
drivers on average. They drive 94 per cent as many miles as the average among all 
drivers.  
 
The research in this paper examines a number of options for the future taxation of cars 
and their use that have been under discussion in recent years. The rationale is that 
charging can be used to create economic disincentives for car use. The focus of the paper 
is the distributional effects of such measures and how to prevent regressivity. The options 
investigated were: 
 
1.  Increasing fuel duties and abolishing vehicle excise duty (VED) 
2.  Increasing fuel duties and using the money to subsidise public transport 
3.  Increasing fuel duties and using the money to increase benefits 
4.  Graduated vehicle excise duty (VED) 
5.  Graduated car purchase tax 
6. Congestion  charging 
7.  Domestic tradable quotas 
 
The final approach takes a broader view of carbon emissions. Under domestic tradable 
quotas (DTQs), each individual would be provided with an annual allowance of carbon 
emissions. Those who emitted more than their quota would have to buy additional rights 
from those who produced less. It would apply to all direct carbon emissions, from use of 
domestic energy, motoring and air travel. 
 
2. Increasing fuel duties and abolishing vehicle excise duty 
(VED) 
 
An old favourite for reform of motoring taxation has been increasing fuel duties in a 
revenue-neutral fashion, returning the money to motorists through reduction or even 
abolition of vehicle excise duty (VED). The argument is that VED is a tax on ownership, 9 
while fuel duty is a tax on use. Conversely, it can be argued that once a household has 
purchased a car the marginal cost of use is usually substantially below the marginal cost 
of using public transport for the same journey, so car use is relatively inelastic to fuel 
price in the short term – in the longer term, fuel prices do have an effect on the choice of 
location to live and the model of car bought. It is the high fixed costs of car ownership 
that deter some households from taking up motoring. If the fixed costs are lowered, they 
may buy a car and switch almost entirely from public transport, as most car-owning 
households do. 
 
The distributional impact of increasing fuel duties and abolishing VED was examined in 
some detail by Skinner and Fergusson (1998). Sixty-eight per cent of all households and 
41 per cent of low-income households owned cars, but in rural areas 80 per cent of all 
households and 57 per cent of low-income households owned cars. Low-income drivers 
would on average be better off if there was a shift from VED to fuel taxation because they 
spent 78 per cent of the average figure on fuel and drove 77 per cent as much distance. 
However, rural low-income motorists on average spent 90 per cent of the average on fuel 
and drove 94 per cent of the average distance for all motorists. Skinner and Fergusson 
calculated that reducing or abolishing VED would on average benefit even rural low-
income motorists. Low-income motorists would on average have benefited by £38 per 
annum and rural low-income motorists by £18 per annum. It is worth noting, however, 
that because of the variation in fuel used a minority of low-income motorists would have 
lost out. We calculate based on figures from the 2000-01 Family Expenditure Survey that 
about 30 per cent of low-income motorists (those in the lowest four deciles) would have 
been losers and about 17 per cent of motorists in the lowest two deciles would have been 
losers. We are not able to calculate the proportion of rural low-income motorists who 
would have been losers, although it would probably be nearly half. Since Skinner and 
Fergusson’s research was conducted there has been a reform of VED so that it is no 
longer at a flat rate. Low-income motorists on average drive slightly smaller cars than 
motorists as a whole, although the difference between rural low-income motorists and the 
average is very small (ibid), so the proportion of low-income losers from the reform 
would be slightly higher now than calculated. 
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Another problem is the sensitivity of the public and politicians to increases in fuel duty. 
Certainly among politicians the level of fuel duty appears at the moment to have reached 
the limit of acceptability. 
 
3. Increasing fuel duties and using the money to subsidise 
public transport 
 
If the concern is to prevent regressive impacts, a way to compensate for an increase in 
fuel duty would be to recycle the money into subsidies for public transport. When the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer froze fuel duty in 1999 he promised that any future increases 
would be hypothecated into transport. What would be the distributional impact of putting 
the money into subsidies for public transport? An analysis was done using data from the 
Family Expenditure Survey 2000-01. It was assumed that a carbon tax equivalent to £10 
per tonne of carbon dioxide (the effective standard rate of the Climate Change Levy for 
companies) would be imposed. The tax would raise approximately £633 million per year. 
The effect of the tax on each decile (using the McClements income equivalence scale) 
before any compensation measures is shown below: 
Table 1: Carbon tax at £10/tonne on road fuels 
Deciles   per cent annual change £  per  cent 
losers 
1 10  -9.59  36 
2 10  -8.30  35 
3 10  -15.60  51 
4 10  -17.88  58 
5 10  -21.71  67 
6 10  -25.36  73 
7 10  -30.29  80 
8 10  -31.77  78 
9 10  -37.13  86 
10 10  -40.65  80 
All 100  -25.43  63 
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The 63 per cent of households shown as losers is slightly lower than the 72 per cent of 
households with at least one car (DfT 2003a). Because the FES is based on a diary of 
expenditure over a fortnight, that is presumably showing that not all households buy fuel 
every fortnight. 
 
If the revenues were redistributed to lower public transport fares in proportion to 
expenditure, that would mean a 14.8 per cent reduction in fares. No elasticity of demand 
has been assumed. The winners and losers according to decile are shown below: 
 
Table 2: Revenues from carbon tax to subsidise public transport 
Deciles   per cent  Mean annual change £  per  cent 
gainers 
 per  cent 
losers 
1 10  +5.93  33  32 
2 10  +5.47  31  30 
3 10  -3.13  26  44 
4 10  -1.39  24  50 
5 10  -1.32  24  55 
6 10  -2.90  23  62 
7 10  +0.58  24  64 
8 10  -0.97  23  64 
9 10  -7.80  24  68 
10 10  +4.82  22  68 
All 100  0.00  25  54 
 
What is striking is that even in the bottom two deciles, there appear to be as many losers 
as gainers. However, since 63 per cent of households in the bottom quintile (the bottom 
two deciles) do not have a car, what the table is really showing is that a large proportion 
of the poorest households without a car on average travel by public transport less than 
once a fortnight as well. It is also apparent from the table that the smaller number of 
households that use public transport heavily tend to gain at the expense of the larger 
number of households that rely entirely or almost entirely on their cars. However, a 12 
significant number of wealthy households also benefit, particularly in the top decile, 
where the average gain is rather substantial. 
 
Rail travel is concentrated in the higher deciles. The poorest tend to use buses and 
coaches rather than trains to travel. What would be the effect of putting all the money into 
subsidies for buses and coaches? The table below shows the outcome: 
 
Table 3: Revenues from carbon tax to subsidise buses and coaches 
Deciles   per cent  Mean annual change £  per  cent 
gainers 
 per  cent 
losers 
1 10  +19.82  32  31 
2 10  +15.12  30  30 
3 10  +6.75  26  42 
4 10  +9.51  25  48 
5 10  +6.12  25  53 
6 10  +2.56  22  61 
7 10  +0.53  21  67 
8 10  -9.81  17  67 
9 10  -10.05  20  71 
10 10  -30.29  11  74 
All 100  0.00  22  54 
 
The distribution is significantly more progressive, but the number of losers in the lower 
deciles diminishes only very slightly. What instead happens is that the gainers in the 
lower deciles gain a lot more, while the gainers in the higher deciles gain less. That is 
because people in poorer deciles who use public transport tend to use buses and coaches, 
while people in higher deciles who use public transport tend to use trains. 
 
Although both options are progressive, the fact that essentially all the households even in 
the poorer deciles that have cars lose out means that the measure does not address the 
objection raised to increasing fuel duties: that it would adversely affect car-dependent 
poorer households. 13 
 
4. Increasing fuel duties and using the money to increase 
means-tested benefits 
 
Would it be more effective to use the revenues to increase benefits instead? During the 
fuel tax protests of 2000, one of the present authors (Paul Ekins) was interviewed on the 
Today programme and he defended increases in fuel duty. He was challenged about the 
impact on poor rural motorists who did not have a practical option of using public 
transport. He suggested that they could be compensated through the benefits system. 
 
Targeting benefit assistance at motorists only would be undesirable because it would 
create a perverse incentive to buy a car. Targeting assistance at people in rural areas 
would be strange because in other ways their cost of living is lower than for people in 
urban areas. We have simply examined the effect of using the revenues from the carbon 
tax on petrol and diesel described above to increase means-tested benefits. 
 
The calculations below were performed on behalf of the authors by Holly Sutherland of 
Cambridge University using the POLIMOD model of the tax and benefits system linked 














Table 4: Effect of carbon tax with partial take-up of existing benefits 
Deciles %  annual 
change £ 
% of income  % losers  % 
losing > 
£2pw 
1 10  -13.05  0.65  42.3  0.7 
2 10  -12.22  0.10  44.9  0.7 
3 10  -15.50  0.10  47.2  1.1 
4 10  -17.16  0.11  53.0  1.1 
5 10  -21.37  0.11  61.5  0.9 
6 10  -27.20  0.12  68.3  3.7 
7 10  -31.15  0.12  76.1  3.0 
8 10  -35.36  0.12  77.3  4.2 
9 10  -38.95  0.11  78.4  6.6 
10 10  -41.96  0.08  76.9  10.2 
All 100  -25.38  0.16  62.6  3.2 
Households with children  29.1  -33.02  0.12  74.4  4.3 
Hholds with pensioners  30.7  -14.14  0.08  46.2  1.2 
 
The £633 million raised from the carbon tax are used to increase means-tested benefits. 
Income Support, means-tested Jobseeker’s Allowance and Pension Credit are raised by £1 
per week for a single person and £1.60 for a couple. The same level of increases are also 
made through Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit for households that are eligible 
for those benefits, but not for the means-tested income replacement benefits. Child Tax 
Credit is increased by 60p a week for each child and Working Tax Credit by £1 a week 







Table 5: Effect of a carbon tax with compensatory increases in means-tested 
benefits 
Deciles %  average  net 
change 
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  % 
losing > 
£2pw 
1 10  40.04  17.2  56.7  0.3 
2 10  51.79  17.0  69.6  0.1 
3 10  34.16  21.3  57.6  0.3 
4 10  19.66  33.8  49.8  0.3 
5 10  0.00  48.6  28.6  0.6 
6 10  -14.72  61.9  19.1  3.1 
7 10  -24.96  72.7  9.5  2.3 
8 10  -30.78  74.2  6.0  3.4 
9 10  -37.75  77.7  1.2  6.4 
10 10  -40.25  75.8  1.6  9.5 
All 100  0.00  50.0  30.0  2.7 
Households with children  29.1  11.34  53.7  35.8  3.6 
Households with pensioners  30.7  11.28  33.7  41.3  0.9 
 
Using the revenues to increase means-tested benefits significantly reduces the number of 
poor households that lose from imposing a carbon tax on petrol and diesel, although about 
47 per cent of low-income motorists (not shown in Table 5), and about 36 per cent of 
motorists in the lowest two deciles, remain losers. Very few lose out by a large amount, 
however. Increasing benefits is less effective than abolishing VED at compensating low-
income drivers, although it is of course more progressive overall because it also helps the 
majority of those on low incomes who live in households without a car. Another problem 
is that the poor households that remain losers are likely to be those that are most car 
dependent. The particular concern that is often expressed is about poorer motorists living 




The calculations above assume only partial take-up of benefits. The calculations below 
more optimistically assume 100 per cent take-up of means tested benefits in order to see 
to what extent the problem is just of poor take-up.  
 
100 per cent take-up of benefits alters the distribution of the deciles. The first table shows 
the effect of the carbon tax on the new deciles: 
 
Table 6: Effect of carbon tax with 100 per cent take-up of existing benefits 








 per  cent 
losing > 
£2pw 
1  10  -13.26 0.63 43.7 0.8 
2  10  -12.69 0.10 45.1 1.0 
3  10  -14.92 0.10 46.7 0.6 
4  10  -17.26 0.10 52.5 1.1 
5  10  -22.00 0.11 63.4 1.2 
6  10  -27.14 0.12 68.4 3.5 
7  10  -30.52 0.12 74.4 2.8 
8  10  -35.46 0.12 76.9 4.4 
9  10  -38.95 0.11 78.5 6.6 
10  10  -41.96 0.08 76.9 10.2 
All  100  -25.43 0.16 62.7 3.2 
Households  with  children 29.1  -33.02 0.12 74.4 4.3 
Households  with  pensioners  30.7  -14.14 0.08 46.2 1.2 
 
The £633 million raised from the carbon tax are used to increase means-tested benefits. 
Income Support, means-tested Jobseeker’s Allowance and Pension Credit are raised by 
£0.80 per week for a single person and £1.30 for a couple. The same level of increases are 
also made through Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit for households that are 
eligible for those benefits, but not for the means-tested income replacement benefits. 
Child Tax Credit is increased by 50p a week for each child and Working Tax Credit by 
80p a week for each claim. 17 
Table 7: Effect of a carbon tax with compensatory increases in means-tested 
benefits and 100 per cent take-up 






 per  cent 
losing > 
£2pw 
1 43.68  10.9  76.6  0.3 
2 46.64  12.5  77.4  0.1 
3 34.32  17.4  71.9  0.1 
4 18.82  29.5  57.3  0.3 
5 -0.99  46.7  32.3  0.9 
6 -14.72  60.9  21.5  3.0 
7 -23.87  70.1  11.5  2.0 
8 -31.25  74.3  5.9  3.4 
9 -37.60  77.2  1.5  6.4 
10 -40.09  75.6  1.9  9.5 
All 0.00  47.5  35.8  2.6 
Households with children  11.44  49.2  42.1  3.5 
Households with pensioners  10.66  31.0  51.4  0.8 
 
Using the revenues to increase means-tested benefits significantly reduces the number of 
poor households that lose from imposing a carbon tax on petrol and diesel, although about 
37 per cent of low-income motorists (not shown in Table 7), and about a quarter of 
motorists in the lowest two deciles, remain losers. Very few lose out by a large amount, 
however. Increasing benefits is less effective than abolishing VED at compensating low-
income drivers, although it is of course more progressive overall because it also helps the 
majority of those on low incomes who live in households without a car. Another problem 
is that the poor households that remain losers are likely to be those that are most car 
dependent. The particular concern that is often expressed is about poorer motorists living 
in rural areas where there is little public transport and it is necessary to travel long 
distances.  
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It could also be argued that using the revenues in this way is not very efficient. 
Nonetheless, the exercise shows that benefits could be used to largely offset the negative 
effects of such a tax increase on the poorest households. 
 
5. Reform of graduated vehicle excise duty (VED) 
 
There are currently two systems of VED. For cars first registered before 1 March 2001, 
the rates are £110 for cars up to 1549cc and £165 for cars over 1549cc. The system for 
cars registered on or after 1 March 2001 is more complicated and described in Table 6 
below: 
 
Table 8:  VED Bands Related to Carbon Emissions for Different Vehicles 
Bands Carbon  dioxide 
emissions (g/km) 
Diesel car  Petrol car  Alternative fuel cars 
AAA  Up to 100  £75  £65  £55 
AA  101-120  £85 £75 £65 
A  121-150  £115 £105 £95 
B  151-165  £135 £125 £115 
C  166-185  £155 £145 £135 
D  Over  185  £165 £160 £155 
 
The only cars in Band AAA are hybrids: Honda Insight, Honda Civic IMA and Toyota 
Prius. City cars such as the Smart and the Suzuki Alto are in Band AA. Band A is mostly 
represented by diesel cars in the supermini and small car classes and petrol superminis. 
Band B is dominated by petrol superminis and small diesel cars. Band C is mostly small 
petrol cars and larger diesel cars. Band D is mostly larger petrol cars and big diesel cars. 
Diesel cars currently have much higher nitrogen oxides and particulates emissions than 
petrol cars, which is why the car tax rates for diesel cars with the same level of carbon 
dioxide emissions are slightly higher than those for petrol cars, although the smallness of 
the difference is controversial as diesel cars contribute disproportionately to urban air 
pollution. However, the Euro IV emissions standard for diesel cars will significantly 
reduce nitrogen oxides and particulates emissions. 19 
Before the introduction of the 2001 reform, there was discussion about the VED system. 
One reason for choosing carbon dioxide emissions is that emissions of other pollutants 
are much higher in older cars that tend to be bought second-hand by the poorer than in 
newer cars, so any system based primarily on other pollutants would tend to be regressive 
(Skinner and Fergusson 1998). Emissions of other pollutants are determined 
overwhelmingly by legislation, whereas carbon dioxide emissions are largely a function 
of engine size. 
 
From the rates set out in Table 6, it can be seen thatwith the new system does not really 
contain a really strong disincentive to buy a ‘gas guzzler’. It was designed to be revenue 
neutral and to establish new incentives to buy more efficient cars. A disincentive to 
purchase vehicles with high carbon emissions could be introduced by creating an 
additional Band E with a significantly higher rate for cars with emissions above say 200 
g/km that would apply to cars with 2 litre petrol engines and above. 
 
Table 6 also shows that the difference in rates of VED is presently very small in relation 
to the purchase cost of new cars and so unlikely to make any impact significant impact on 
buying decisions. Increasing the rates would at present make little difference to poorer 
households because few of them own post-2001 cars, but over time it would have an 
impact. About 6 per cent of cars owned by low-income households have an engine 
capacity above 2000 cc, compared to about 8 per cent of cars owned by all households 
(Skinner and Fergusson 1998), so that the impact on poorer households of a new Band E 
would be not dissimilar in absolute terms to its impact on car-owners as a whole, while 
proportionally it could be greater. However, it is not clear that arguments based on ‘need’ 
apply to vehicles of this size. 
 
VED could be more effectively related to CO2 emissions by replacing the bands that 
currently exist with a more graduated system along the lines of the reform to company car 
taxation made in 2002. Since April 2002, company car taxation has been calculated on the 
basis of the car’s CO2 emissions and its list price when new. The tax rate starts at 15 per 
cent of the car’s price, for a small car emitting 155 g/km of carbon dioxide, then rises in 1 
per cent steps for every additional 5 g/km over 155 g/km - up to a maximum of 35 per 20 
cent of the car’s price. Diesel cars are subject to a further 3 per cent surcharge, up to the 
35 per cent maximum. The 155 g/km minimum will be reduced to 145 g/km in 2004/05. 
 
If VED started at the present Band AAA rate for any car with emissions below 100 g/km 
and then increased by £5 for every additional 5 g/km then the amount of VED paid would 
remain almost exactly the same until a car had emissions above 200 g/km. Under such a 
scheme the present cap on VED for ‘gas guzzlers’ would be removed. 
 
6. Graduated car purchase tax 
 
The UK had a Special Purchase Tax on cars until its abolition in 1992. Many other 
European countries have a purchase tax on cars. It is widely perceived that new cars have 
been much more expensive in the UK than in other EU countries, but that does not take 
account of the fact that the prices quoted are pre-tax. This perception led to new cars 
being targeted in the Government’s campaign against ‘Rip-off Britain’. In reality, 
Denmark, Finland and Greece all have high rates of purchase tax on new cars, which 
encourage people in those countries to buy smaller cars, and car manufacturers attempt to 
compensate by offering some models at very low pre-tax prices, presumably cross-
subsidised by charging higher prices in other countries that charge less tax. The 
Competition Commission (2000) found that levels of car taxation were similar to those in 
the UK in France, Germany and Italy. At that time, the pre-tax prices of new cars were on 
average 10-12 per cent lower in those countries than in the UK. In the past three years, 
UK new car prices have continued to fall. However, a perception seems to remain that 
new cars are more expensive in this country. 
 
Low-income motorists buy very few new cars, but changes in the price of new cars are 
rapidly reflected in the second-hand market, so a graduated purchase tax would also 
increase costs for low-income motorists unless compensating measures were taken. The 
way to compensate for a graduated car purchase tax would be to reduce or abolish VED. 
The buyers of second hand cars have at best a small and indirect impact on the make-up 
of the car fleet. It is the buyers of new cars who choose the cars that will be on the roads 
for the next decade or so, even though new car buyers only own the cars for a few years 
themselves. Replacing VED with a car purchase tax graduated according to carbon 21 
dioxide emissions would mean that buyers of new cars would be faced with a significant 
direct incentive to choose more efficient vehicles. It would have much more effect on car 
purchasing decisions than VED because the equivalent of about 14 years of VED for the 
average life of a car (Burnham 2001) would be included in the sticker price of new cars 
and the variation in tax between models would amount to hundreds of pounds paid 
upfront. The change could not be made overnight as it would distort the market for new 
and used cars, but could it could be brought in with incremental increases in the car 
purchase tax and compensating reductions in VED for cars first registered in that year 
over a period of about five years. 
 
About 50 per cent of all new cars sold in the UK are bought by company car drivers, who 
have been subject to taxation based on carbon dioxide emissions since 2002. Private car 
buyers of course have an incentive to buy more fuel-efficient cars in a way that company 
car drivers have not traditionally had, except through the power of fleet managers, but it 
is known that they tend to pay little attention to it in their purchasing decisions (Eriksson 
1993). An upfront tax that varied according to the carbon dioxide emissions of the car 
might increase the significance of this factor in their car-purchase decisions. 
 
The difficulty in introducing the measure might lie in the perception of the public and 
politicians that higher prices for new cars are an aspect of ‘Rip-off Britain’, even if the 
increase was compensated for in reductions in VED. New car buyers (who tend to be 
richer) would feel the effect immediately and would doubtless be vociferous in their 
complaints. 
 
7. Congestion charging 
 
In the last few years, the major focus for discussion in the area of motoring taxation has 
been congestion charging. The fuel tax protests of 2000 are widely perceived to have 
closed the door to any increases in fuel duty at least for the foreseeable future. Interest in 
road pricing has increased still further recently with the success of the congestion 
charging scheme introduced to central London. The revenues raised from the congestion 
charge are used to pay for improvements to public transport. 22 
The case for a nationwide system of road charging with satellite tracking of vehicles 
using the Global Positioning System was put forward strongly in a report by the 
Commission for Integrated Transport (2002). Drivers would be charged for travelling on 
busy roads at different rates according to the road and the time of day, but travel on 
uncongested roads would remain free. CfIT started from the assumption that any system 
of road charging would at least initially have to be revenue neutral, so it proposed that 
VED and fuel duty should be reduced to compensate for congestion charges. A charging 
scheme was presented that would raise £5.7 billion per year, compared to the existing £27 
billion per year raised from fuel duty and VED, compensated for with a reduction in fuel 
duty of 12p per litre or the abolition of VED and a reduction in fuel duty of 2p per litre. 
They presented the results of modelling which indicated that with the latter option the 
charge could in aggregate reduce congestion by 44 per cent and traffic by up to 5 per cent, 
while increasing travel speeds by 3 per cent. CfIT assumed that nationwide road charging 
would be introduced after the completion of the government’s 10 Year Transport Plan in 
2010. 
 
CfIT’s argument is that for transport policy to be effective road users should pay charges 
that reflect the marginal costs they impose on society. They cited an analysis by the 
Institute for Transport Studies at Leeds University which had estimated that most of the 
marginal cost of road transport is from congestion, while the contribution to climate 
change only accounts for a few per cent (ITS 1998). CfIT argued that fuel duty is a crude 
method of making road users pay for the external costs of their journeys because although 
it relates to carbon dioxide emissions, it does not relate to other external costs, including 
pollution and particularly the largest external cost, congestion. They also asserted that 
present car taxation is unfair because it often penalises those who can least afford it and 
those who have to rely on cars because of poor or non-existent public transport, for 
instance in rural areas. CfIT did not model the actual distributional effects of their 
nationwide road-charging scheme. 
 
However, we can deduce that a revenue neutral congestion charging system would lead to 
a redistribution of money from urban drivers to rural drivers. If revenue neutrality was 
achieved by reducing fuel duty then essentially all urban drivers would lose and all rural 
drivers would gain. That would be the case for both richer and poorer motorists. If instead 23 
revenue neutrality was achieved by abolishing VED then low-mileage/off-peak urban 
drivers would generally pay less in congestion charges than they would gain, but high-
mileage/peak-time urban drivers would generally lose and rural drivers would still gain. 
 
IPPR (Foley and Fergusson 2003) has recently published the results of research they 
commissioned from Stephen Glaister and Dan Graham of Imperial College showing that a 
revenue-neutral congestion charging system offset by a 12p per litre reduction in fuel 
duty could actually increase road traffic in England by nearly 7 per cent and increase 
carbon dioxide emissions by 5 per cent. The effect of a revenue-neutral charge would be 
to make urban motoring more expensive, but it would make rural motoring cheaper. 
Roads in rural areas would experience a significant growth in traffic. By contrast, a 
revenue-raising charge would, according to their modelling, lead to a nearly 7 per cent 
decrease in total traffic and an 8 per cent decrease in carbon dioxide emissions from 
traffic. The IPPR report acknowledged that it would be politically challenging to 
introduce a revenue-raising charge, but suggested that VED be abolished in order to make 
it more acceptable to motorists. They also suggested that some of the additional revenues 
from congestion charging could be put into public transport. It is worth noting, although 
they did not, that an alternative policy of increasing fuel duty and compensating with the 
abolition of VED would do more to reduce overall traffic and carbon dioxide emissions, 
although it would not reduce congestion nearly so much and would have a 
disproportionate impact on low-income rural motorists with above average annual 
mileage. 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn. Reducing fuel duty in order to compensate for the 
introduction of congestion charging would actually increase traffic overall and have 
negative environmental consequences. It would increase the car dependence of society, 
particularly in rural areas, further increasing the social exclusion of the poorest and most 
marginalised members of society (who do not have cars). It would also make tend to 
make poorer urban motorists lose out, although poorer rural motorists would gain. 
Abolition of VED to compensate for congestion charging would be progressive overall 
because on average poorer motorists drive rather less than the average for all motorists. 
The poorer rural motorists who drive nearly as much as the average for all drivers would 
certainly gain because congestion charging would not affect them for most of their 24 
driving, but it would have a negative impact on a significant number of poorer urban 
motorists who drive at peak times. The effect that this level of congestion charging would 
have on overall traffic levels is not very great (a reduction of about 5 per cent), although it 
would reduce congestion by up to 44 per cent (CfIT 2002). Higher levels of congestion 
charging could be used to support public transport, but because households with cars use 
public transport so little the effect would be that almost all households with cars except 
those in uncongested rural areas would lose out financially. The intention is that better 
public transport would tempt people out of their cars. The reality is that people would 
switch to public transport only if congestion charging was imposed at a high enough rate 
that the marginal cost of public transport was lower than the perceived marginal cost of 
travelling by car. That would require high rates of congestion charge. 
 
The success of the London congestion charging scheme in reducing traffic in central 
London has shown that congestion charging can work in the UK. Congestion charging 
has reduced the number of cars entering central London by 16 per cent and reduced 
congestion by about 30 per cent. Journey times in the charging zone have reduced by 
about 15 per cent. Only about 20 to 30 per cent of the traffic reduction in the zone has 
been diverted around it – 50 to 60 per cent has switched to public transport and 15 to 25 
per cent has involved other adaptations (TfL 2003). 
 
Car ownership is somewhat lower in London than in the UK as a whole at 60 per cent, 
compared to 70 per cent nationally. Only 18 per cent of London households who would 
be in the poorest decile nationally have a car, compared to 25 per cent in the UK as a 
whole. Among the London households that would be in the richest decile nationally, 94 
per cent have a car, compared to 98 per cent nationally (Crawford 2000). London’s 
richest 50 per cent of households provide 70 per cent of car-owning households and 88 
per cent of those who drive to work in the city centre (ROCOL 2000). 
 
The Institute of Fiscal Studies tried to work out what the congestion charge would cost 
households with differing earnings, using (rather dated) behaviour patterns from the 1991 
London Area Transport Study and assuming no change in travel patterns as a result of the 
charge. It found that households in the top few percent of earnings drive, on average, once 
a week into the charging zone, so are likely to pay £5 weekly. The projected cost falls 25 
progressively as income falls - those in the top fifth of income distribution would pay 
roughly £2.50, households around the median £1, and those in the bottom fifth would pay, 
on average, about 10p a week. The average charge as a percentage of income was about 
0.1 per cent for most of the lowest two deciles, it peaked at nearly 0.5 per cent in the fifth 
decile, just below the middle of the income distribution and then fell to between 0.3 and 
0.4 per cent in the upper half of the income distribution (Crawford 2000). Nonetheless, 
the outcome was basically progressive. Because car ownership rises sharply as you go 
through the income deciles, the relative burden on the poorest car owners is greater than 
on richer car owners, although not by very much because in London poorer households 
drive much less than richer ones and drive into central London particularly infrequently. 
It is possible to calculate from the figures provided by Crawford (2000) that a car driver 
in the lowest two deciles would on average spend about 0.5 per cent of household income 
on the congestion charge. A car driver in the middle of the income distribution would on 
average spend about 0.8 per cent of household income. A car driver in the top fifth would 
on average spend about 0.4 per cent of household income. It would be interesting to know 
what the actual distributional effect of congestion charging has been, but there is as yet no 
data available on that. 
 
London is not typical of the UK in its car ownership and driving patterns. What would be 
the impact on low-income motorists of congestion charging elsewhere? The only research 
that has been done on that is a study on the effect in Leeds of seven different hypothetical 
congestion charging schemes (Bonsall and Kelly 2003). The models simulated the 
characteristics of travellers from probabilities derived from a number of sources, most 
particularly the small area statistics available from the Census, but also the National 
Travel Survey, the Journey to Work Census, the Household Income Survey, the 
Household Expenditure Survey, the New Earnings Survey and a number of local travel 
surveys. Most of the data used applied to the situation in Leeds in the early 1990s, 
although information on incomes, total trip volumes and the transport network was from 
the late 1990s. 
 
Three different cordons were drawn to simulate the effect of using each: one of the 
commercial, civic and retailing centre of Leeds; one just inside the inner ring road; and 
one just inside the outer ring road. Different kinds of charging scheme were used in 26 
conjunction with the different charging areas: a charge levied on inbound traffic at the 
morning peak hour (8 am to 9 am); a charge related to the total distance travelled within 
the appropriate cordon (either the inner or outer ring road); and a charge related to the 
time spent on the road within the appropriate cordon (either the inner or outer ring road). 
The idea behind a time-based charge is to create an incentive for drivers to avoid 
congested areas themselves. The charge for crossing the cordon just inside the inner ring 
road was £2 and the charges for the other options were set to raise an equivalent amount 
of revenue. 
 
The effect of the charge on drivers with an annual income of less than £10,000 was 
examined. The figure was chosen because for these people a daily charge of £2 would 
amount to almost 5 per cent of their income. The effect on disabled, elderly, lone-parent, 
female and ethnic minority drivers was also examined. The disabled, elderly and lone 
parents were considered vulnerable in terms of access. Women and ethnic minorities were 
considered potentially vulnerable in terms of personal security. 
 
Fewer people were affected by charges for crossing a cordon between 8 am and 9 am, but 
the charges they paid were therefore higher. Again, more people were affected by a 
distance or time charge for travel within the outer ring road than the inner ring road, but 
consequently average charges were lower. Indeed, the rates charged were so much lower 
that the maximum charges paid were also lower, despite the potential for much longer 
journeys. The policy which required the fewest low-income drivers to pay more than £2 
(set as the threshold for concern about social exclusion) was a distance-based charge for 
travel within the outer ring road. However, this scheme meant that more elderly drivers 
had to pay at least £2 than in the scheme where charges were for the distance travelled 
within the inner ring road.  
 
The study also considered the effect of different kinds of exemptions and the ‘leakage’ of 
revenue to groups that mostly do not have low incomes. For instance, it was found that 
only 8 per cent of disabled drivers had an income under £10,000. Most exemptions (e.g. 
for disabled drivers, hospital visitors, etc) did not reduce revenues much, but an 
exemption for residents of any charge zone would significantly reduce revenues, 27 
particularly where the charges were for distance or time travelled within the outer ring 
road. 
 
Although the details of the effects of different charging schemes are of great interest for 
the design of a scheme in Leeds, they are not of great relevance nationally. What is 
important and likely to be relevant nationally is that the study showed that, for a given 
revenue raised, a policy under which charges are proportional to the distance driven 
within the charge area would have less serious consequences for at-risk groups and that, 
although the number of affected drivers is higher when the charge area covers a large area 
of the city, the number of low-income drivers having to pay significant daily charges is 
less than when the charge area is restricted to the city centre. Conversely, if the charge is 
based on drivers crossing a cordon, then the situation is reversed because a small cordon 
area affects fewer people, but to a greater extent as relatively few people drive into Leeds 
during morning rush hour compared to the number driving into the city centre from 
within Leeds. These findings are likely to be true for other cities. The research seems to 
strengthen the case for a satellite-based distance-charge system rather than a 
technologically simpler one based on a cordon. 
 
On the other hand, the problem with sharing out the cost across as many people as 
possible is that the financial impact on individuals could be reduced to such an extent that 
it may have little effect on their driving patterns. People with cars may be induced to 
switch to public transport in large numbers if the marginal cost of travel by car is clearly 
greater than by public transport, as has been the case in London, but not if car travel still 
appears cheaper. 
 
8. Domestic tradable quotas 
 
The idea of domestic tradable quotas (DTQs) is rather different from the other schemes 
proposed. It does not take road travel in isolation, but instead looks at all the direct carbon 
dioxide emissions of households. The idea behind DTQs is that every adult resident 
would receive for free an equal number of carbon units to cover their annual carbon 
emissions, including private transport. Businesses and other organisations would have to 28 
buy their quota from government. Those who used less than their entitlement could sell 
their surplus units to others who needed more. (Fleming 1998). 
 
Central to the DTQ scheme is a computer database in which the carbon unit account for 
all citizens and organizations is held, and in which all carbon unit transactions, be they 
issuing, surrendering, buying or selling, are recorded. All transactions are conducted 
electronically. For example, a customer purchasing petrol would simply have their smart 
card swiped by the petrol station attendant, thereby transferring the carbon units 
corresponding to their purchase from their carbon unit account to that of the company 
owning the petrol station. For those purchasers of fuel and electricity without carbon units 
to surrender at the point of sale, for example, foreign visitors and individuals who have 
used all their units, the relevant number of carbon units are simply purchased 
electronically on the national market by the fuel or electricity seller on behalf of the 
purchaser. The purchaser then pays the seller for these units and surrenders them in the 
usual manner (Anderson and Starkey 2003). 
 
DTQs differ substantially from other instruments in their allocation of emission rights 
relating to citizens’ direct purchase of fuel and electricity. Under other instruments such 
as a carbon tax these emission rights are effectively allocated on the basis of citizens’ 
ability and willingness to pay, whereas under DTQs they are explicitly allocated on an 
equal per capita basis. DTQs therefore have the potential to be a more equitable method 
of rationing emissions than carbon taxes. 
 
Assigning quotas would require a national population register, which has been a 
stumbling block to the idea because it would be expensive to set up. The government’s 
current plans to create a national identity card mean that a national population register 
will be set up anyway over the course of the next decade. It would then be relatively easy 
administratively to assign quotas and create a system of DTQs. 
 
Data on domestic energy consumption in the English House Condition Survey and the 
Family Expenditure Survey shows that once household size is taken into account, 
domestic energy consumption (and carbon emissions) hardly increases through the deciles 
(Dresner & Ekins 2003). Because of enormous variations in the efficiency of the building 29 
stock, mostly due to the standards to which homes have been built at different times, the 
variation in domestic energy consumption (and carbon emissions) within deciles is much 
greater than that between deciles. 
 
First the distributional effect of a DTQ system that provided each individual with an 
allowance based on the average carbon emissions from domestic energy, petrol and diesel 
was examined. Emissions from trains, buses and aviation were not included. Since carbon 
emissions from cars are fairly progressive (meaning that low-income households produce 
proportionately less carbon emissions in relation to their income than richer households), 
while carbon emissions from domestic energy are regressive (meaning that low-income 
households produce proportionately more carbon emissions in relation to their income 
than richer households), it is interesting to examine what the effect of DTQs would be. 
 
An issue which arises is the treatment of children. The proponents of DTQs believe that 
only each adult should be assigned a quota. Fleming (1998) has suggested that there could 
be an increase in child benefit to help parents pay for the carbon emissions due to their 
children, although he does not specify where the money to do that would come from. The 
proposal modelled here compares a scheme with adult-only DTQs with one in which each 
child also receives a quota of half the adult amount that would be administered by their 
parents. 
 
The tables below show the effect for deciles with equivalent incomes of DTQs for 
domestic and motor fuel depending on whether or not children are assigned a half quota. 
For the sake of example, it is assumed that the value of a tonne of carbon dioxide on the 














Table 9: Effect of DTQs with a quota for each adult only 
Deciles average  net 
change £/year




 per  cent 
losing > 
£1pw 
1 18.00  25  75  5 
2 15.73  29  71  3 
3 16.23  30  70  4 
4 11.32  35  65  5 
5  5.57 43  57 7 
6 -2.33  49  51  8 
7 -1.03  53  47  10 
8 -12.95  61  39  16 
9 -10.47  57  43  16 
10 -32.87  71  29  27 
All  0.00 45  55 11 
Households with children  -7.31  52  48  15 











Table 10: Effect of DTQs with a quota for each adult and half a quota for each 
child 






 per  cent 
losing > 
£1pw 
1 27.25  21  79  4 
2 15.98  31  69  2 
3 16.88  32  68  4 
4 11.87  38  62  5 
5  7.42 41  59 7 
6 -1.95  50  50  8 
7 -3.84  50  50  10 
8 -14.83  62  38  18 
9 -8.96  45  55  17 
10 -37.55  77  23  31 
All  0.00 47  53 11 
Households with children  +12.21  37  63  10 
Households with pensioners  +7.76  37  63  3 
 
There is not much difference in the outcomes of the two methods in terms of the 
percentage of each decile that gains or loses, although quotas for children do lead to fewer 
losers in the bottom decile. The difference is mostly in which households gain or lose, 
rather than how many gain or lose at each income level. Quotas only for adults favours 
households without children over those with children. Quotas for children as well favours 
households with children over those without. 
 
The objection to providing quotas for children is that it might encourage people to have 
children in order to get a bigger carbon quota. However, not providing quotas for children 
would be politically controversial, particularly in the light of government concern about 
child poverty and the fact that small children are especially susceptible to the health 
effects of low indoor temperatures. On the other hand, not providing quotas for children 
allows larger quotas for each adult, which helps another politically important and 32 
sensitive group, pensioners (37% of pensioner households are losers from the with-child 
quota scheme, compared to 31% from the without-child quota). 
 
About thirty per cent of poorer households lose out if only domestic and motor fuel are 
covered under DTQs. Flying is the other major source of greenhouse gas emissions that 
could be directly accounted for. Public transport is a small source of emissions and from a 
carbon emissions point of view should be encouraged in order to substitute for car and 
plane travel, so emissions from public transport have not been covered by DTQs. 
 
Figures presented below show that people on low incomes fly very little, while people on 
high incomes fly a great deal. The relationship is strongly progressive. Bringing 
emissions from aviation into the equation would not only make the effect of DTQs more 
progressive, it would do something to restrict the extremely rapid growth in emissions 
from aviation that is currently unchecked because international aviation is not covered 
under the Kyoto Protocol and the UK Government’s Climate Change Programme. 
 
The data on air travel in the FES does not accord very well with the data in the 
International Passenger Survey (IPS).
1 The IPS indicates that about 39 million 
international air round trips for non-business purposes were taken by UK residents in 
2002. Of these, about 18 million were part of package holidays and 21 million were not 
part of package holidays. The FES data instead suggests that at least one member of about 
15 million households went on a package holiday in 2001-2, but at least one member of 
only 4 million households flew abroad for non-business purposes not on a package 
holiday. These figures can best be reconciled if it is assumed that the respondents to FES 
took a broader interpretation of a package holiday than respondents to IPS. The FES asks 
respondents about expenditure on package holidays that they have undertaken in the last 
three months, but only about scheduled airline tickets they have bought in the two weeks 
of the diary. They may report holidays that are not strictly all-inclusive package holidays. 
Over forty per cent of all the purchases of personal air tickets in the sample (18 of 43) 
were by households in the top decile. 
 
The Civil Aviation Authority only surveys a selection of airports each year, but its last 
survey of a wide range of English regional airports as well as the London airports and 33 
Manchester recorded a similar pattern according to social class. Its statistics indicated that 
members of class A and B (the top 22 per cent) were around 8 times more likely to fly 
than members of social class E (the bottom 12 per cent). FES showed that members of the 
top two deciles were about 8 times more likely to have bought a package holiday in the 
last 3 months than members of the bottom decile. 
 
The calculations that follow should therefore be taken as only a rough guide. It was 
assumed that the data on non-package holidays was too unreliable to be used because of 
the small numbers recorded and the degree of extrapolation required. Instead, data on air 
travel was based on the reported number of package holidays in each decile. It was 
assumed that each member of a household went on the holiday. The International 
Passenger Survey shows that the average length of the round trip for a package holiday is 
1830 miles by a Great Circle route, equivalent to a London-Ibiza return flight. The 
average length of a round trip for a non-package leisure flight is slightly longer at 2060 
miles by a Great Circle route, equivalent to a London-Malaga return flight. The site 
www.chooseclimate.org calculates the carbon dioxide emissions of a Great Circle route, 
allowing for the additional fuel used in take-off and landing as well as the cruise phase. It 
is also necessary to take account of the additional greenhouse warming potential of 
emissions from aviation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates the 
greenhouse warming potential to be 2.7 times that of the carbon dioxide alone (IPCC 
1999). A round trip of 1950 miles therefore has a greenhouse warming potential 
equivalent to 1.2 tonnes of carbon dioxide and that was the assumed length of each flight. 
These assumptions are rather conservative because richer people are much more likely to 
use long-haul travel, which accounts for a disproportionate quantity of emissions, but 
there was no way to quantify that given the limitations of the data available. Expenditure 
on package holidays varies much more in relation to the category of accommodation than 
to distance. These calculations are also unable to take account of people who fly more 
than once a year because that could not be quantified with the available data. The people 
who do that are probably strongly concentrated in the top two deciles, since 75 per cent of 
passengers on budget airlines are from social classes A and B (Bishop and Grayling 
2003). 
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The following distributional impacts were calculated depending on whether or not 
children get quotas: 
 
Table 11: Effect of DTQs including aviation with a quota for each adult only 






 per  cent 
losing > 
£1pw 
1 25.23  24  76  4 
2 22.99  26  74  3 
3 22.22  25  75  5 
4 13.03  33  67  7 
5  5.07 44  56 11 
6 -4.47  52  48  12 
7 -4.44  50  50  14 
8 -18.34  65  35  19 
9 -24.44  67  33  24 
10 -37.86  77  23  31 
All  0.00 46  54 13 
Households with children  -12.54  56  44  22 













Table 12: Effect of DTQs including aviation with a quota for each adult and half 
a quota for each child 






 per  cent 
losing > 
£1pw 
1 36.31  18  82  3 
2 23.55  27  73  2 
3 23.10  27  73  4 
4 14.48  34  66  7 
5  7.32 43  57 8 
6 -3.58  47  53  10 
7 -7.32  54  46  13 
8 -20.23  68  32  21 
9 -29.60  75  25  27 
10 -42.95  78  22  31 
All  0.00 48  52 13 
Households with children  +11.14  41  59  13 
Households with pensioners  +12.33  32  68  2 
 
The effect of including aviation makes the measure even more progressive, but about a 
quarter of low-income households still lose out, although only a few per cent lose a large 
amount. Including aviation has not had such a large effect in making DTQs more 
progressive as might have been hoped, although it should be borne in mind that the 
figures presented above are probably conservative and in reality would be somewhat 
more progressive. 
 
Lumping together emissions from domestic energy, motoring and air travel in a DTQ 
system does not appear to be the best approach from the point of view of concern about 
the impact on the poor. Many poor households live in older properties that would be 
expensive to bring up to proper standards of energy efficiency. The emissions that they 
create to keep warm are for a basic need. By contrast, it is hard to argue that flying away 
on a foreign holiday is a basic need.  36 
Finally, we consider DTQs that apply only to greenhouse gas emissions from motoring 
and aviation: 
 
Table 13: Effect of DTQs for motoring and aviation emissions with a quota for 
each adult only 






 per  cent 
losing > 
£1pw 
1 17.24  15  85  2 
2 18.43  11  89  1 
3 13.40  21  79  2 
4  8.06 28  72 3 
5  1.86 35  65 6 
6 -3.49  47  53  8 
7 -5.62  51  49  8 
8 -13.39  59  41  12 
9 -17.71  66  34  14 
10 -19.78  65  35  16 
All  0.00 40  60 7 
Households with children  -9.68  54  46  13 











Table 14: Effect of DTQs for motoring and aviation emissions with a quota for 
each adult and half a quota for each child 




 per  cent 
gainers 
 per  cent 
losing > 
£1pw 
1 22.21  11  89  1 
2 18.68  12  88  1 
3 13.80  21  79  2 
4  8.71 27  73 3 
5  2.87 37  63 4 
6 -3.09  48  52  7 
7 -6.92  46  54  7 
8 -14.25  61  39  12 
9 -20.03  68  32  14 
10 -22.07  67  33  16 
All  0.00 41  59 7 
Households with children  +0.94  45  55  9 
Households with pensioners  +14.74  8  92  0 
 
Even with conservative assumptions, only a small percentage of low-income households 
lose out from either option, although allowing quotas for children is slightly more 
progressive than not doing so.  
 
Lumping together emissions from domestic energy, motoring and air travel in a DTQ 
system does not appear to be the best approach from the point of view of concern about 
the impact on the poorest households. Many low income households live in older 
properties that would be expensive to bring up to proper standards of energy efficiency. 
The emissions that they create to keep warm are for a basic need. By contrast, it is hard to 
argue that flying away on a foreign holiday is a basic need. From the viewpoint of 
concern about social justice, a DTQ system that only covered motoring and aviation is 
preferable. 
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Another way to tackle the problem of rapidly increasing emissions from aviation would 
be through a tax on aviation emissions. The European Parliament has passed a resolution 
calling for the establishment of an environmental charge based on greenhouse gas 
emissions on all air travel inside the EU and to other destinations. The revenue would be 
collected by national governments to be earmarked to fund measures to offset the 
greenhouse gas emissions of air travel. It might be possible to ensure that such a tax did 
not cause poorer households in the UK collectively to lose out financially if a small 
percentage of the revenues were put in to supplement existing schemes to improve 




Decisions about what would be the best policies to pursue to reduce the environmental 
impact of transport without causing negative impacts on the poor depend particularly 
heavily on political judgements. Unlike domestic energy, water and waste disposal, 
motoring is not yet an essential need for most poor people in the UK. Nearly a third of 
households do not have a car and nearly two-thirds of households in the poorest quintile 
are without one. Measures which increase the cost of motoring are progressive, not 
regressive, on average. Concern about negative impacts on the poor has therefore been 
about the impact on the minority of the poor who own cars. 
 
The same issue arises with taxation of air travel. People on low incomes travel relatively 
infrequently by plane. The rich account for the great majority of air travel. The aviation 
industry puts forward the populist argument that increasing the cost of air travel would 
price the poor, but not the rich, out of the skies. The problem with this kind of thinking is 
that it ignores the global context. It simply is not environmentally sustainable for 
everyone in the world to drive cars (using current technologies) or travel in aeroplanes 
(using any technology in prospect). Relatively poor people in the UK are still much better 
off materially than most of the people in the world. The negative impacts of climate 
change will be felt mostly by very poor people in developing countries. Arguments that 
we should not impose any restrictions on people’s freedom to drive or fly out of concern 
for social justice miss the point and are frequently disingenuous. Nonetheless, it is 39 
reasonable to ask that policies to reduce the environmental impact of transport should not 
disproportionately impact the poor. 
 
Of the various charging or taxation methods examined, VED is currently the least 
effective in restraining carbon emissions, notwithstanding its recent reformulation so that 
duty rates now reflect fuel efficiency. VED could be made more environmentally 
effective by increasing the rates or by allowing the rates on the least fuel-efficient cars to 
increase to reflect their greater carbon emissions. 
 
Table 15 summarises the results of the various tax/compensation options for both 
reducing CO2 emissions and limiting the effects on low-income households or motorists. 
It can be seen that, in respect of increasing fuel duty, abolishing VED is a more effective 
approach to compensating poorer motorists than either subsidising public transport 
(which motorists tend not to use) or increasing benefits (which benefits non-motorists as 
well as motorists).  
 
From an environmental point of view, it would be more effective to replace VED by a 
purchase tax graduated according to CO2 emissions. By effectively lumping together all 
the annual VEDs payable during a car’s life into the purchase price, a significant 
difference in purchase price between low and high carbon vehicles would be created, 
which would be likely to influence purchase decisions more than when the payments are 
spread out over a number of years. However, although a graduated car purchase tax 
would be more effective than graduated VED at influencing vehicle-purchasing decisions 
in an environmentally favourable direction, it would not have much effect on vehicle use. 
It will encourage people to buy more fuel-efficient cars, but not discourage them from 
driving. Eriksson (1993) concluded that a combination of carbon taxes and a purchase tax 
based on carbon dioxide emissions was the best way to reduce emissions as car buyers 
substantially underestimate the cost of fuel in their purchasing decisions. Low-income 
motorists could avoid being made worse off if VED was replaced by a graduated car 
purchase tax by changing to more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
 
Abolishing VED was also identified as the most effective way to compensate for 
congestion charging, which is the most sophisticated approach to the spatial consequences 40 
of traffic growth. It can vary the charge according to the expected driving conditions at 
any given time or place. It can be used to target urban motorists who have the most 
possibility to travel by public transport instead. Unfortunately, although congestion 
charging is effective at reducing congestion, it is less effective than fuel duty at restricting 
overall levels of traffic and their carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
The Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT 2002) has highlighted the argument that 
the marginal social costs of congestion are much greater than the marginal social costs of 
the pollution caused by cars. If the aim is to internalise external costs, then from the point 
of view of environmental economics, a congestion charge is better than fuel duty although 
it is less effective as an environmental measure. 
 
Congestion charging may also be politically more acceptable than increasing fuel duty in 
the UK, even if VED were abolished to compensate. The public objection to higher fuel 
duty is frequently expressed in the form that people need an alternative before they can be 
taxed more highly for using their cars. The impact on those in rural areas would be 
emphasised, as it was during the protests in 2000. Congestion charging has the great 
advantage that it can be focused on places and times where there are public transport 
alternatives. People are not being penalised for something that is considered unavoidable, 
but being given an incentive to use public transport rather than their cars when possible. It 
is perceived as being much fairer. 
 
A relatively small congestion charge that was compensated for with the abolition of VED 
would cut congestion significantly, but it would only reduce traffic and carbon dioxide 
emissions by 5 per cent at most (CfIT 2002), equivalent to a couple of years’ traffic 
growth. As Foley and Fergusson (2003) argue, a congestion charge would need to be 
revenue raising in order to tackle traffic growth. The revenues that it would be necessary 
to raise to prevent traffic growth are substantial, of the same order of magnitude as the 
government spends on transport at the moment (Foley and Fergusson 2003). A revenue-
raising congestion charge would mean that virtually all urban motorists would lose, 
although rural motorists would be only marginally affected. However, demand for public 
transport in urban areas would rise, requiring more investment rather than a decrease in 
VED, while demand for public transport in rural areas would fall as motoring would 41 
become cheaper there, making people in rural areas even more car dependent than they 
already are. In general, subsidies for public transport are an ineffective method of 
compensation for low-income motorists because most households that have cars hardly 
use public transport, but the experience in London shows that congestion charging can 
lead to a shift towards public transport when it is an easy alternative. A way to try to 
reduce the impact on low-income motorists would be to vary the size of the charge 
according to the size of the vehicle, although it would have only a limited effect because 
low-income motorists on average drive only slightly smaller vehicles than richer 
motorists. It is difficult to see how to restrain traffic growth through congestion charging 
without having some impact on low-income urban motorists.  
 
As an alternative to taxation, emissions from households’ transport and energy use could 
be limited through the use of DTQs. The paper shows that over two-thirds of households 
in the bottom two deciles, and nearly two-thirds of all households with pensioners and 
children, are made better off through a DTQ system involving motoring and household 
energy use that gives children half the adult quota. The percentages increase to around 
90% if the DTQs involve motoring and aviation (reflecting the greater involvement of 
high-income households in these activities), except for households with children, when 
the percentage falls to 55%. 
 
The conclusion from this research is that a system of DTQs covering motoring and 
aviation would be an efficient and progressive way of controlling carbon emissions from 
these sources. In their absence, and in a political context that makes increased fuel duties 
politically infeasible, at least partly because of their impact on low-income motorists, 
revenue-raising congestion charges could be used to control traffic growth and hence 
emissions, with low-income motoring households being compensated through the 
abolition of VED, and further compensation being given, if desired, through the benefits 
system. This could be combined with a charge on greenhouse gas emissions from 
aviation, as proposed by the European Parliament. 
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Table 15:  Effects on households of various changes in taxation on motoring in order to reduce CO2 emissions 
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